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COMMENTS
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY IN
WISCONSIN NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS
INTRODUCTION
Students of tort law are occasionally confronted with the use of
the phrase "limitation of duty" as a label for those cases where, under
circumstances clearly showing a negligent act, the courts have declined
to impose liability. Limitation of duty is, in fact, only one of several
theories which can be used by a court in holding that there is no
liability. There may be a duty to the injured party, plus a negligent
act, but with no liability arising because the manner in which the injury
occurred was too unusual or improbable, even though the injury was
in fact caused by the negligent act. A third, and perhaps narrower,
theory is applied to limit liability where the court believes that a so-
cially undesirable new area of liability would arise if the type of injury
involved were actionable. These various theories are so interrelated
that they cannot be studied as separate and distinct topics.
This article will attempt to discuss the development of the law in
the particular fact situation to which these theories typically apply.
This fact situation has three characteristics: first, there must be a
negligent act; second, there must be causation in fact; and third, the
courts must recognize a reason for limiting liability. The first two
characteristics are assumed to exist in the discussion since the law has
developed around the courts' treatment of the third characteristic, the
reason for limiting liability.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in the recent case of Schilling v.
Stockel, - was faced with a fact situation in which the plaintiff was
driving his car with his left arm resting on the windowsill. The de-
fendant was approaching from the opposite direction in a pickup
truck. A large carton was blown off the pickup truck by a gust of
wind. It struck the plaintiff's car and injured his elbow.
The court was concerned mainly with the question of the plaintiff's
contributory negligence. The jury had attributed fifty per cent of the
causal negligence to the plaintiff. On appeal, the court held that al-
though they could not find that the plaintiff was free from negligence
as a matter of law, nevertheless ". . upon these facts, public policy
precludes the attachment of liability for his conduct." 2 The court then
directed entry of judgment for the full amount of the plaintiff's damages.
The majority held, in effect, that the jury could under these facts
find that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent, but that the court
could, after this finding, rule that there should be no liability therefor,
due to considerations of "public policy."
126 Wis. 2d 525, 133 N.W. 2d 335 (1965).
2 Id. at 534, 133 N.W. 2d at 339.
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DECISIONS PRIOR TO SCHILLING V. STOCKEL
Before further consideration of the reasoning of the majority and
concurring opinions, it is necessary to examine the cases which the
court said were determinative of the issues involved in Schilling. The
court summarized the applicable law as follows:
On a number of occasions, this court has considered the prob-
lem presented when there is a negligent act accompanied by an
extraordinary injury. There was a period in our judicial history
when we accepted the view of the New York court of appeals
in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co. (1928), 248 N.Y. 339, 162
N. E. 99. Under such view, if there was an injury resulting from
careless action which was not reasonably apparent to the one
so acting, there was deemed to be no breach of duty to the
injured party; he was simply outside of the zone of risk. Waube
v. Warrington (1935), 216 Wis. 603, 258 N. W. 497.
Commencing in 1952, with Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway Theater,
Inc. (1952), 262 Wis. 229, 55 N. W. (2d) 29, we ruled on a
number of cases in which we rejected "the no-duty formula of
Palsgraf and Waube," to use the phraseology of Longberg v.
H. L. Green Co. (1962), 15 Wis. (2d) 505, 516, 113 N. W.
(2d) 129, 114 N. W. (2d) 435. See Colla v. Mandella (1957),
1 Wis. (2d) 594, 598, 85 N. W. (2d) 345, and Klassa v. Mil-
waukee Gas Light Co. (1956), 273 Wis. 176, 77 N. W. (2d)
397. Duty is still an important factor in determining whether an
act is negligent. . . . However, once an act has been found to
be negligent, we no longer look to see if there was a duty to the
one who was in fact injured.3
PALSGRAF V. LONG ISLAND R. R. Co.
The first case cited by the court is the famous Palsgraf case.' In
that case the plaintiff was injured by a falling scale which was sup-
posedly knocked over by an explosion resulting when an employee
of the defendant, while helping a passenger board a train, jarred loose
a package containing explosives which the passenger was carrying.
This case, in the majority and dissenting opinions, crystallized the
two opposing views on the subject. Justice Cardozo for the majority
set forth the no-duty approach. He felt that there was no negligence
with respect to the plaintiff, since there was no duty to protect her
from something as unforeseeable as the accident in question.
Negligence, like risk, is thus a term of relation. Negligence in
the abstract, apart from things related, is surely not a tort, if in-
deed it is understandable at all.5
Thus, Cardozo stated the rule that foreseeability of injury to the par-
ticular person, or one in a like position, was an element to be considered
in determining if there was a duty owed.
3 Id. at 531, 133 NAV. 2d at 338.
4 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
3 Id. at 345, 162 N.E. at 101.
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Justice Andrews, in his dissent, stated:
The proposition is this: Everyone owes to the world at large the
duty of refraining from those acts that may unreasonably threat-
en the safety of others. . . Unreasonable risk being taken, its
consequences are not confined to those who might probably be
hurt.6
His theory is that if anyone is endangered, the actor is negligent toward
society as a whole. Once this negligence is established, foreseeability
as to the particular type of chain of events that occurred is irrelevant
to establish a duty.
It is apparent that foreseeability has its place in both theories. Under
Cardozo's approach, the person actually injured, or one in a like posi-
tion, must have been foreseeably endangered by the defendant's act,
and danger to parties not actually injured is irrelevant. Cardozo did
not discuss causation, since he felt that there was no negligence upon
which to base causation.
Justice Andrews begins his discussion of causation by stating that
where injuries "result" from an unlawful act, the defendant is liable
for the consequences.7 It does not matter whether or not the injuries
were foreseeable." He subsequently implies that by "result" he means
"proximate cause." It is then stated that in determining causation, one
factor is whether or not there was a ". . . natural and continuous se-
quence between cause and effect."' 10 Thus he treats "foreseeability" as
involving different concepts than those involved in finding a "natural
and continuous sequence." It is arguable that what is natural is fore-
seeable and vice versa. Andrews did not state what he thought the
difference to be.
There is a question as to the actual issue involved in Palsgraf.
Cardozo's position is fairly clear, but it is uncertain whether Andrews
was saying that there was a jury question as to whether the plaintiff
was endangered, or that it made no difference whether or not he was
endangered.
WAUBE V. WARR1NGTON
The first Wisconsin case to cite Palsgraf was WVaube v. Warring-
ton.11 There the plaintiff's wife died of shock after seeing their
daughter killed by the defendant's auto. The court held that there
could be no recovery, and used language similar to that used by Car-
dozo in Palsgraf, although the court did not state that it was following
the Palsgraf decision. The court stated that the duty must be deter-
6 Id. at 350-351, 162 N.E. at 103.
7Id. at 351, 162 N.E. at 103.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Id. at 354, 162 N.E. at 104.
11216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
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mined before causation could be discussed. 12 It was then stated that
the duty cannot be extended beyond the field of physical peril.13 How-
ever, in addition to this language the court also recognized the policy
argument that to impose liability for mental shock arising from fear
for the safety of others would impose too great a burden on the users
of the highways. 14 The possibilities of liability would be greatly in-
creased if this were to be allowed. Thus there are two separate theories
evident in the opinion, either one of which would be sufficient to sup-
port the decision reached.
It should be noted that in Waube there was not actually a Palsgraf
type fact situation. There was no actual physical contact which caused
the injury to the plaintiff's wife, which might place the case in an area
of the law separate and unique from direct-physical-contact cases. Also,
it is arguable that the type of injury involved was actually foreseeable.
which was not the case in Palsgraf. A few other states have applied
the reasoning of Palsgraf to this type of fact situation.'5
PFEIFER V. STANDARD GATEWAY THEATERS, INC.
The next case which purported to deal with the same problem was
Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway Theater, Inc.-6 The court in that case was
confronted with a trial court's jury instruction which used the language
"natural and probable result"'1 and "ought reasonably to foresee"' 8
with reference to the method of determining proximate cause. In re-
versing, the supreme court held that foreseeability is not an element of
causation, 9 citing Osborne v. Montgomery.'0 Also, the use of the term
"substantial factor" 21 was recommended instead of "proximate cause."
By eliminating foreseeability as an element of causation, the court
seemed to go farther than the position taken by Justice Andrews in his
dissent in Palsgraf. Andrews said that there was causation if there was
a "natural and continuous sequence between cause and effect." The
Wisconsin court in Pfeifer implies that the word "natural" involves
foreseeability, and is therefore undesirable. But to completely eliminate
foreseeability would result in liability for all consequences which could
be traced back to the negligent act, as long as there be no intervening
12 Id. at 605, 258 N.W. at 497.
13 Id. at 613, 258 N.W. at 501.
14 Ibid.
15 Curry v. Journal Publishing Co., 41 N.M. 318, 68 P. 2d 168 (1937) (cites
Waube extensively); Blanchard v. Reliable Transfer Co., 71 Ga. App. 843,
32 S.E. 2d 420 (1944) ; Cote v. Litawa, 96 N.H. 174, 71 A. 2d 792 (1950);
Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A. 2d 879 (1952).
16262 Wis. 229, 55 N.W. 2d 29 (1952).
17 Id. at 233, 55 N.W. 2d at 31.
is Ibid.
19 Id. at 235-236, 55 N.W. 2d at 32.
20o203 Wis. 223, 234 N.W. 372 (1931).




cause. The court recognized that this would be going too far, and quali-
fied the holding:
[I]n cases so extreme that it would shock the conscience of
society to impose liability, the courts may step in and hold as a
matter of law that there is no liability....
• . . If the jury does determine that there was negligence, and
that such negligence was a substantial factor in producing the
injury, it is then for the court to decide as a matter of law
whether or not considerations of public policy require that there
be no liability.
22
This tells us that the court must make a determination of when the
conscience of society would be shocked. But the case gives no guide-
lines as to what type of fact situation would shock this collective
conscience.
KLASSA V. MILWAUKEE GAS LIGHT CO.
The next case cited in Schilling as bearing on the question of limita-
tion of liability is Klassa v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co. 2 3 The plaintiff
was denied recovery in this case because the testimony indicated that
her physical illness was caused not by anxiety for her own safety, but
for the safety of others. The court re-affirmed the reasoning of Waube
on similar facts, saying that the conclusion reached was grounded upon
judicial policy. 2 Of the two arguments advanced in Waube the court
emphasized the policy argument.
Whenever a court holds that a certain act does not constitute
negligence because there was no-duty owed by the actor to the
injured party, although the act complained of caused the injury,
such court is making a policy determination.25
This general statement seems to indicate that either the court was ignor-
ing the Palsgraf theory of "no-duty because no foreseeability," admit-
tedly not applicable in Klassa, or they were saying that foreseeability is
a consideration in finding public policy.
COLLA V. MANDELLA
The court was soon considering the problem again in Colla v Man-
della.2 6 Here the injured party was sleeping in his house when it was
struck by a runaway truck owned by the defendant. He subsequently
died of a heart attack. The court allowed recovery for injuries result-
ing from fear of personal injury. Waube and Klassa were cited as not
holding to the contrary.27 The court again discussed the possibility of
22 Id. at 238-240, 55 N.W. 2d at 34-35.
23 273 Wis. 176, 77 N.W. 2d 397 (1956).
24 Id. at 182-183, 77 N.W. 2d at 401.
25 Id. at 183, 77 N.W. 2d at 401.
26 1 Wis. 2d 594, 85 N.W. 2d 345 (1957).
27 Id. at 598, 85 N.W. 2d at 348.
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limiting liability where the consequences of the negligent act are un-
usual or improbable.
It is recognized . . . that even where the chain of causation is
complete and direct, recovery may sometimes be denied on
grounds of public policy because the injury is too remote from
the negligence or too "wholly out of proportion to the culpability
of the negligent tort-feasor." . . .28
The decision did not add much to previous decisions, other than to
rephrase the "conscience of society" concept in the slightly more specific
terms of remoteness and proportion of injury to culpability. Since the
plaintiff recovered there was still no indication of what would sufficiently
shock the conscience to limit liability.
LONGBERG v. H. L. GREEN CO.
The last in the string of cases cited in Schilling as being applicable
to the question at hand was Longberg v. H. L. Green Co.29 There the
plaintiff was injured by a fall on an icy sidewalk. The ice had been
formed by water which had leaked from the defendant dentist's up-
stairs office and had travelled down through the walls and onto the
sidewalk. The court allowed recovery against the dentist, saying that
his liability was not wholly out of proportion to his culpability.30
The court stated:
The public-policy determination formula of Pfeifer, Klassa, and
Colla seems to us a more realistic description of what a court
does when it declines to impose liability in these situations than
the no-duty formula of PaIsgraf and Waube.31
This was the state of the law immediately prior to the Schilling
case. It is clear from the language used in Longberg that the court
considered the Waube type fact situation to be the same as the "re-
moteness" or "disproportion of injury to culpability" situation which
was discussed in Pfeifer, Colla, Klassa and Longberg, for purposes of
limiting liability. It should be noted, however, that in none of these
latter cases did the court find that there was a degree of remoteness or
disproportion which was sufficient to deny recovery. The policy con-
sideration discussed in Waube was the undesirability of placing an
undue burden on the users of the highways. This is a social policy
which is aimed at promoting a desirable change, or discouraging an
undesirable change, in society. The questions of remoteness or dis-
proportion of injury to culpability appear to be considerations of
justice and fair play rather than social policy. "Judicial policy" is a
better term to describe this latter type of policy consideration. The term
28Id. at 598-599, 85 N.W. 2d at 348.
29 15 Wis. 2d 505, 113 N.W. 2d 129 (1962).




"public policy" has, through judicial definition in countless jurisdictions,
become so general in meaning that it can include both types of con-
sideration discussed here.32 The very fact of its generality makes it
almost meaningless.
The question of whether or not Wisconsin ever adopted the no-duty
rule of Palsgraf has little bearing on the present state of the law, unless
and until a true PaIsgraf type fact situation arises in a Wisconsin case.
If in fact this rule ever was adopted, it has not been used or emphasized
in cases subsequent to Waube. However, it has never been directly
repudiated, although some dicta in the cases may so indicate.
The only two cases where the plaintiffs were denied recovery on
grounds of public policy were Waube and Klassa, and they were de-
cided on the basis of a desirable social result, with no question of fore-
seeability involved. Thus, the question prior to Schilling was how fore-
seeability would fit into the considerations of public policy used by
the court in limiting liability. The Wisconsin court has never, at least
since Waube, had before it a true "fantastic chain of events" fact situ-
ation where the result was clearly unforeseeable to the negligent actor.
Thus, the only definite law prior to Schilling was that the court
could limit liability where a desirable social result was thereby effected,
and that the jury could not consider foreseeability in determining
causation.
IMPLICATIONS OF SCHILLING
The Schilling case represents the first instance where the court has
declined to impose liability because of public policy where the policy
was of the "justice and fair play" variety, rather than the "social
engineering" variety. The question then becomes whether or not the
decision provides any substantial guidelines for the future.
In Schilling, as in Longberg,33 the court treated the previously dis-
cussed cases as involving a single type of fact situation with only one
rule of law applicable. There was no mention, either in Schilling or in
the other Wisconsin cases, of sub-classifying the fact situations beyond
the general heading of "a negligent act accompanied by an extraordinary
injury." As previously stated, Palsgraf3 4 has been interpreted so broadly
in other jurisdictions35 that it might be said to support this very general
32 "The term 'public policy' is perhaps the most expansive and widely compre-
hensive phrase known to the law .... The phrase is used in several senses,
and it may mean the common law or general statutory law of the state, and
it may mean the prevalent notions of justice and general fundamental con-
ceptions of right and wrong, and it may mean both ....
"'Public policy' is further defined as being that rule of law which declares
that no one can lawfully do that which tends to injure the public, or is detri-
mental to the public good .. " 72 C. J. S. Policy (1951).
33 Longberg v. H. L. Green Co., 15 Wis. 2d 505, 113 N.W. 2d 129 (1962).
24 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
35 Note 15 supra.
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classification. But, an analysis of the case will reveal that only a very
narrow type of fact situation was involved. Not only was there a com-
pletely unexpected chain of events which was set in motion by the
defendant's negligent act, but the person injured was not the one en-
dangered by the original act. If the person carrying the package had
been injured by the exploding fireworks, there would still be an un-
foreseeable chain of events, but the injury would have been foreseeable.
There are actually three possible types of fact situations in any
negligence action: (1) a foreseeable injury may be caused by a fore-
seeable chain of events; (2) a foreseeable injury may be caused by
an unforeseeable chain of events; and (3) an unforeseeable injury may
be caused by an unforeseeable chain of events.3 6 In jurislictions where
the no-duty rule of Palsgraf is followed, it is essential to know whether
or not the facts in a given case fit into the third category, which is the
only one where the no-duty rule applies. Cardozo said that in this cate-
gory there can be no liability. In jurisidictions which follow this, a clear
distinction is made between the "unforeseeable injury from unforesee-
able chain of events" situation and the injury which results to a particu-
lar person from a general menace, where it is not necessary to identify
in advance the exact person who will be injured.3 7
If the no duty rule is not the law in Wisconsin, there is no
necessity of making the foregoing classifications, at least with respect
to the determination of duty, but Wisconsin has had no judicial deter-
mination of the exact question involved in Cardozo's decision. Waube38
is the only case that is even arguably close to the Palsgraf type fact
situation, since the mother was clearly beyond the physical danger area.
Even so, it can be said that the mental shock was forseeable. In both
Klassa39 and Colla ° the injured parties were clearly within the physical
danger area, and in Pfeifer"' and Longberg42 there was a general risk
such that if any class of persons was endangered, the plaintiff was a
member of that class. There can be no final determination of this point
in Wisconsin until a fact situation fitting the "unforeseeable injury
36 It is obvious that there can be no fourth category with unforeseeable injury
resulting from a foreseeable chain of events which, by definition, involves a
foreseeable injury.
37 "We see little similarity between the Palsgraf case and the situation before
us . . . [A] ship insecurely moored in a fast flowing river is a known danger
not only to herself but to the owners of all other ships and structures down-
river, and to persons upon them .... The shipowner and wharfinger in this
case having thus owed a duty of care to all within the reach of the ship's
known destructive power, the impossibility of advance identification of the
particular person who would be hurt is without legal consequence." Petition
of Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F. 2d 708, 721-22 (2d Cir. 1964).
38 Waube v. Warrington, 215 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
39 Klassa v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 273 Wis. 176, 77 N.W. 2d 397 (1956).
40 Colla v. Mandella, 1 Wis. 2d 594, 85 N.W. 2d 345 (1957).
41 Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway Theaters, Inc., 262 Wis. 229, 55 N.W. 2d 29
(1952).
4 Longberg v. H. L. Green Co., 15 Wis. 2d 505, 113 N.W. 2d 129 (1962).
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from unforeseeable chain of events" category is litigated, with the
question of duty being raised. The Wisconsin jury instructions, which
contain no requirement that the injured party be endangered by the
original negligent act in order to recover,43 assume that the no-duty
rule is not the law in Wisconsin. The dictum in Schilling that the no-
duty formula of Palsgraf has been rejected is at least a strong indica-
tion that it would be rejected.
The only alternative to the no-duty rule is the "duty to the world
at large" rule espoused by Justice Andrews in his Palsgraf dissent.
But, this applies only to considerations of duty. Andrews clearly indi-
cated that foreseeability of the injury was an element of causation to
be considered by the jury. It is unquestionably the law in Wisconsin
that foreseeability is not a consideration in determining causation. Thus,
if the "duty to the world at large" rule is coupled with the substantial
factor rule of causation there is absolutely no occasion for the jury
to consider whether or not the injured party was endangered by the
original negligent act. Not even Justice Andrews' Palsgraf dissent
goes this far.
The court in Schilling also did not differentiate between situations
where the plaintiff's contributory negligence is in question and situa-
tions where only the defendant's negligence is in question. The differ-
ence between these two types of situations may be relevant in the
"foreseeable injury from unforeseeable chain of events category."
There is a split of authority as to whether or not there should be
recovery where the person who was endangered by an act is the one
who was injured, but by an unexpected chain of events.4 4 The reason
given for allowing recovery is that ". . . as between an entirely inno-
cent plaintiff and a defendant who has been negligent as to results lying
within the risk, the burden of the loss due to consequences beyond the
risk should fall, within some ultimate limits, upon the wrongdoer." 45
However, it is arguable that liability should not attach where there is
contributory negligence, since there is no completely innocent party.
43 "A person fails to exercise ordinary care when, without intending to do any
wrong, he does an act or omits a precaution under circumstances in which a
person of ordinary intelligence and prudence ought reasonably to foresee that
such act or omission will subject the person or property of (himself or)
another to an unreasonable risk of injury or damage." WiscoNsiN JURY IN-
STRUcTIoNs-CIVIL, No. 1005 (1963).
44 "[A] limitation to 'probable' or foreseeable consequences would restrict lia-
bility to the scope of the original risk created, and make the test of re-
sponsibility for the result identical with the test of negligence. This view has
had considerable support in modern cases ......
"There is an opposing view, that a defendant who is negligent must take
existing circumstances as he finds them, and may be liable for consequences
brought about by his acts, even though they were not reasonably to be antici-
pated." PROSSER, TORTS 48 at 260 (2d ed. 1955); see also PRossER, ToRTS§50, at 289-90, 299 (3rd ed. 1965).
45 aRossER, TORTS §48 at 260 (2d ed. 1955).
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Having looked at what the court did not say in the decision, the
next question is what it explicitly stated the law to be.
The court began by discussing the treatment of "arm out the
window" cases in other jurisdictions:
A few cases in other jurisdictions have taken the view that one
whose arm is injured while extended from a motor vehicle is
contributorily negligent as a matter of law, but the majority of
cases have recognized this to be a question for the jury .... 46
In fact, there are no cases cited in the A.L.R. annotation relied upon
by the court which hold that having an arm out the window is con-
tributorily negligent as a matter of law without some foreseeable danger
before the accident, such as a car approaching on the wrong side of
the road,47 or where the injured party's own car has gone out of con-
trol.48 Thus, in a fact situation like Schilling, where there was no
unusual occurrence or warning to the plaintiff before the accident, there
is overwhelming authority 49 that the issue of contributory negligence
should be determined by the jury. The Schilling decision does not
discuss why, in the face of such authority, the decision was in practical
effect taken from the jury.
Justice Beilfuss, in his concurring opinion, stated that the plaintiff
was not negligent as a matter of law, because there was nothing in the
surrounding circumstances which would indicate any danger.50 Justice
Beilfuss stated the governing law as follows:
The main question raised by the cases contained in the present
annotation is whether the extension of a hand, arm, or other
portion of the body from a motor vehicle constitutes contributory
negligence. The majority of cases have taken the view that this
is a question for the jury, and the courts have generally sustained
the verdict of the jury in favor of the plaintiff, although a few
have taken the view that under the circumstances of the particu-
lar case the plaintiff's position constituted contributory negligence
as a matter of law....
. . . Every case, of course, turns upon its individual fact
situation. 51
Justice Beilfuss stated further that he agreed with this as a general
statement, but that it did not apply under the facts of Schilling. How-
ever, the cases in the annotation indicate that there are two alternatives;
either the question is one for the jury or the plaintiff is negligent as a
matter of law. Justice Beilfuss contends that either the question is one
for the jury or the plaintiff is not negligent as a matter of law. The
Schilling fact situation is precisely the type where the jury normally
46 Schilling v. Stockel, 26 Vis. 2d 525, 530-31, 133 N.W. 2d 335, 338 (1965).
4 Winninger v. Bennett, 104 S.W. 2d 413 (Mo. 1937).
48 Black v. City of Berea, 137 Ohio St. 611, 32 N.W. 2d 1 (1941).
49 Annot., 40 A.L.R. 2d 233, 235 (1955).
50 26 Wis. 2d at 541, 133 N.W. 2d at 343.
51 Op. cit. supra note 49.
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determines negligence, and nothing in the facts distinguishes it from
those cases, nor is there any indication by Justice Beilfuss why it
should be so distinguished.
Thus, the court has held that there are factors which are beyond
the province of the jury, but which the court may consider in limiting
liability. The court determined that public policy requires that the
plaintiff not be held liable for his negligent act.52 Nothing was added
which would clarify the meaning of public policy as a guide for the
future. The term itself is the only standard, but is too general.5 3 Until
the court comes forth with a more detailed explanation of the nature
of public policy, the inference arises that the court is using "foresee-
ability," only under a different name.
The Osborne54 case itself, which Pfeifer55 cites as the source of the
doctrine of "no foreseeability in causation," contains language to the
effect that foreseeability, while a consideration in negligence itself,
may also operate to limit the legal consequences of the negligent act
to the actor.56
If "public policy" does contain some element of foreseeability, the
result is a situation where the court is doing what it has said a jury
cannot do. It is limiting liability with a concept which is similar, if not
identical, to the element of foreseeability in causation. If this is so, is
it a desirable state of the law? Dean Prosser has said:
The sole function of a rule of limitation in these cases is to tell
the court that it must not let the case go to the jury. Yet we are
in a realm where reasonable men do not agree. At least if judges
and legal writers be reasonable men they have not agreed .... 5
Justice Fairchild, in his concurring opinion in Schilling, stated that
the question should be left to the jury, with the qualification that on
the facts of the case the negligence of the defendant was greater than
that of the plaintiff.58
CONCLUSION
Many questions remain unanswered. The Schilling decision answered
nothing except the question of whether or not the court would ever
limit liability under the "public policy" theory. There is also strong
dictum to the effect that the no-duty rule will not be followed in Wis-
consin if and when a true Palsgraf type fact situation arises.
The Wisconsin court's use of "negligent act accompanied by an
52 26 Wis. 2d at 534, 133 N.W. 2d at 339.
53 "The term 'public policy' is admittedly one of a vague and uncertain meaning
. . . ." Trumpf v. Shoudy, 166 Wis. 353, 359, 164 N.W. 454, 456 (1917).
54 Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223, 234 N.W. 372 (1931).
55 Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway Theater, Inc., 262 Wis. 229, 55 N.W. 2d 29
(1952).56 203 Wis. at 234, 234 NA., at 376.
57 Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MicH. L. REv. 1, 31 (1953).
58 26 Wis. 2d at 537, 133 N.W. 2d at 345.
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extraordinary injury" as a label for a fact situation is little more than
a statement that the tort of negligence is involved. To imply that
PaIsgraf is the starting point for the development of the law applicable
to the Schilling facts is at the least misleading. The issue argued in
Palsgraf was whether or not there should be recovery for an unfore-
seeable injury resulting from an unforeseeable chain of events. The issue
in Schilling was whether or not, where plaintiff's injury was clearly
foreseeable if defendant was negligent at all, the unforeseeable chain of
events was so unusual as to require the court to hold that there should
be no liability. The confusion is compounded when the public policy
considerations involved in Waube and Klassa are first mixed with ques-
tions of duty and causation and then extended to embrace considera-
tions of foreseeability and disproportion of injury to culpability.
The most important question is still left unanswered. What is the
nature of the "public policy" that guides the court in determining lia-
bility? The conclusion seems inescapable that it is the "foreseeability"
that was eliminated as an element of causation in Pfeifer. It seems to
have developed from a reluctance on the part of the court to go to
the extreme of allowing recovery in every case where the injury could
be traced back to the negligent act under the "substantial factor" test.
If so, why should it not be a jury question whether or not unforesee-
ability of the consequences of a negligent act may preclude recovery?
No reason has been set forth by the court to explain why an ap-
parent jury question should have been taken over by the court. If there
is no strong justification, then the inference may arise that the court
is attempting to remedy a previous mistake without admitting it; that
mistake being the elemination of foreseeability as an element of
causation.
CHARLES F. GRUMLEY
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